The vulnerability of deep image classification networks to adversarial attack is now well known, but less well understood. Via a novel experimental analysis, we illustrate some facts about deep convolutional networks (DCNs) that shed new light on their behaviour and its connection to the problem of adversaries, with two key results. The first is a straightforward explanation of the existence of universal adversarial perturbations and their association with specific class identities, obtained by analysing the properties of nets' logit responses as functions of 1D movements along specific image-space directions. The second is the clear demonstration of the tight coupling between classification performance and vulnerability to adversarial attack within the spaces spanned by these directions. Prior work has noted the importance of low-dimensional subspaces in adversarial vulnerability: we illustrate that this likewise represents the nets' notion of saliency. In all, we provide a digestible perspective from which to understand previously reported results which have appeared disjoint or contradictory, with implications for efforts to construct neural nets that are both accurate and robust to adversarial attack. 2 * S. Jetley and N.A. Lord have contributed equally and assert joint first authorship. 2 MATLAB source code for replicating all experiments will be made available on GitHub.
Introduction
The field of deep networks finds itself forced to confront an apparent paradox. On the one hand, there is the demonstrated success of networks in generalising class distinctions learned on training sets to unseen data in the wild. On the other, there is the vulnerability of the very same networks to adversarial perturbations that produce dramatic changes in class predictions despite being meaningless or imperceptible to humans. A common understanding of the issue can be paraphrased as follows: "While deep networks have proven their ability to distinguish between their target classes so as to generalise over unseen natural variations, they curiously possess an Achilles heel which must be defended." In fact, efforts to formulate attacks and counteracting defences of networks have led to a dedicated competition [1] and a body of literature already too vast to summarise in total.
In the current work, however, we attempt to demystify this phenomenon at a fundamental level. Through a fairly straightforward set of experiments and explanations, we clarify what it is that adversarial examples represent, and indeed, what it is that modern DCNs do and do not currently do. In so doing, we tie together works which have focused on adversaries per se with other works which have sought to characterise network feature spaces.
In short, the celebrated performance of DCNs and their vulnerability to adversarial attack are simply two sides of the same coin: the input image-space directions along which the networks are most vulnerable to attack are the same directions which they leverage to achieve their classification performance in the first place. Their vulnerability owes to the fairly simplistic way in which they 
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Direction-3 truck truck truck truck truck truck truck Figure 1 : Each of the three plots in the top row shows a set of per-image class-score curves, with each curve generated by synthetically varying the component of a selected CIFAR10 image in the single direction represented by the x-axis. Each such direction represents one of the principal directions determined via the decision boundary curvature analysis, described in Sec. 3, of NiN trained on CIFAR10. From left to right, the first three directions are the most positively curved, most negatively curved, and least curved directions for selected class scores. Direction-1 visualises the most positively curved direction for the frog target class. Adding or subtracting this particular pattern of "stray gashes" causes the network to change its prediction from bird to frog: match the row of blue-bordered images to the points indicated along the thick blue trace in the first plot. Likewise Direction-2, the most negatively curved direction for the ship target class, changes ship to non-ship classes as the component magnitude increases on either side of the origin, along the red curve in the second plot. Direction-3 represents the flattest direction for the automobile class and leaves the score for the original class prediction of truck largely unchanged. Perturbations along Direction-1 and Direction-2 constitute adversarial attacks; those along Direction-3 do not.
respond to changes in the input along these directions, measured as the outputs of the logit layer nodes (henceforth called 'class scores'). This vulnerability has three facets, all of which are on display in Fig. 1 , in which each subplot graphs a specific class score for different exemplar images as a function of their synthetically varied component along a particular fixed direction. First, these curves are typically quasi-even and monotonic over large ranges. This means that there exist patterns such that the higher the magnitude of correlation with the input image, the more (or less) the net assumes the corresponding class to be present. Second, the shape of a given class score graph is largely independent of the choice of exemplar, i.e., of the component of the image in the entire space normal to the single direction chosen. Consequently, it is possible to transform the input image basis such that the class score function is approximately additively separable in many input components: each is considered largely out of context of the others. Third and finally, visualisation of the directions in question reveals them to represent low-level structures devoid of a clear semantic link to their corresponding classes.
This de facto structure of the learned function indicates a more simplistic notion of class identity than DCNs are commonly assumed to represent, albeit one that generalises to the test distribution to some extent. Unsurprisingly, this does not align with the way in which humans process the same data: 'adversarial vulnerability' is simply the name given to this disparity and the phenomena derived from it, with the universal adversarial perturbations of [2] being a particularly direct example of this fact. Efforts to improve robustness by "suppressing" nets' responses to components in these directions [3, 4] cannot simultaneously retain full classification accuracy and avoid more fundamental re-engineering of the network's architecture and/or training. The features and functions thereof that DCNs currently rely on to solve the classification problem are, in a sense, their own worst adversaries.
We base our work on the geometric decision boundary analysis of [5] , which we extend and contextualise into a framework that we hope is ultimately simpler and more illuminating than its predecessors, while also being more challenging regarding the current state of DCNs.
Related Work
As this paper addresses the relationship between adversarial attacks and DCNs' representation of class, and also presents implications for the networks' failure modes and what "defending" them can truly mean, we find it helpful to select and categorise the relevant literature as follows:
Fundamental developments in attack methods
Szegedy et al. coin the term 'adversarial example' in [6] , demonstrating the phenomenon's existence via a method for creating imperceptible additive perturbations to classification networks' input images that arbitrary alter the nets' predictions on those images. They use a box-constrained L-BFGS to search for the additive perturbation of minimal 2 norm required to change the class label of an input image to a target label while remaining within intensity bounds. Strikingly, they locate a small-norm perturbation at every point, for every network tested. Further, the adversaries thus generated generalise over nets trained differently from one another, including over different subsets of the data. Goodfellow et al. [7] then propose the "fast gradient sign method" (FGSM) to demonstrate how effective the local linearity assumption is in producing the same result, calculating the gradient of the cost function and perturbing with a fixed-size step in the direction of its sign (optimal under the linearity assumption and an ∞ -norm constraint). The DeepFool method of Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [8] retains the first-order framework of FGSM, but tailors itself precisely to the goal of finding the minimum-norm perturbation which changes the class label of any single given exemplar to any label other than its own. Through iterative attempts to cross the nearest (linear) decision boundary by a tiny margin, the ubiquity of adversaries in [6] is observed under perturbation norms that are smaller still.
In [2] , Moosavi-Dezfooli & Fawzi et al. propose an iterative aggregation of DeepFool perturbations that produces "universal" adversarial perturbations: single images which function as adversaries over a large fraction of an entire dataset for a targeted net. While these perturbations are typically much larger than individual DeepFools, they do not correspond to human perception, and indicate that there are fixed image-space directions along which nets are vulnerable to deception independently of the image-space locations at which they are applied. They also demonstrate some generalisation over network architectures.
Sabour & Cao et al. [9] pose an interesting variant of the problem: instead of 'label adversaries', they target 'feature adversaries' which minimise the classifier-space distance from a particular guide image, subject to a constraint on the ∞ norm of image-space distance from a source image. That is, they perturb the source image not just to the guide image's class, but towards the classifier's representation of that particular guide image. Despite the norm constraint, the adversary mimics the guide very closely: not only is it nearly always assigned to the guide class by the classifier, but it appears to be an inlier in the classification-space guide-class distribution. Finally, while 'adversaries' are conceived of as small perturbations applied to natural images, where the resulting images are still recognisable to humans, the 'fooling images' of Nguyen et al. [10] are completely unrecognisable to humans but are confidently predicted by deep networks to be of particular classes. Such images are easily obtained by both evolutionary algorithms and gradient ascent, under direct encoding of pixel intensities (appearing to consist mostly of noise) and under CPPN [11] -regularised encoding (appearing as abstract mid-level patterns).
Theoretical analysis of adversarial vulnerability
In [12] , Wang et al. propose a nomenclature and theoretical framework with which to discuss the problem of adversarial vulnerability in the abstract, agnostic of any actual net or attack thereof. They denote an oracle relative to whose judgement robustness and accuracy must be assessed. In essence, they illustrate that a classifier can only be both accurate and robust (invulnerable to attack) relative to its oracle if it learns to use exactly the same feature space that the oracle does.
Goodfellow et al. [7] argue that the high dimensionality and (hypothesised) excessive linearity of deep networks explain their vulnerability. Tanay and Griffin [13] begin by taking issue with the aforementioned explanation of [7] through illustrative toy problems. They then advance a hypothetical explanation of vulnerability based on the angle of intersection of the separating boundary with the data manifold, illustrating how this can occur with linear classifiers under certain conditions. The explanation rests on overfitting and calls for effective regularisation, which the authors note is neither solved nor known to be solvable for deep nets.
Over the course of the line of work in [14] , [15] , [5] , and [16] , the authors build up an image-space analysis of the topology of deep networks' decision regions, the geometry of their boundaries, and the connection between decision boundary geometry and adversarial vulnerability. Aside from the empirical observation that class regions are always found to be connected (though non-convex), they reach the key result that curvature 3 of the decision boundary is intimately related to its vulnerability to adversarial attack. More specifically, the majority of image-space directions are found to correspond to near-flatness of the decision boundary and insensitivity to attack, but along the remaining directions, those of significant curvature, the network is indeed vulnerable. Further, the directions in question are found to be shared over exemplars. They illustrate in [5] why a hypothetical network which possessed this property would theoretically be predicted to be vulnerable to universal adversaries, and note that the analysis suggests a direct construction method for such adversaries as an alternative to the original randomised iterative approach of [2] : they can be constructed as random vectors in the subspace of shared high-curvature dimensions. In [15] , they note that the DeepFool perturbations of [8] tend to evince relatively high components in this subspace as well.
Attempts to defend against adversarial attack
The effectiveness of the methods described in Section 2.1 has spurred efforts to mitigate vulnerability to such attacks. Without attempting to be exhaustive, we briefly summarise a sample of such work.
Billovits et al. [17] introduce a prior term at the network output to down-weight the softmax scores of adversaries. This term is modelled as a Gaussian kernel density estimate in a low-dimensional image encoding space, wherein, their method identifies adversaries as being outliers to the training data distribution. Lu et al. [18] make a similar assumption, but in the feature space of DCNs. They propose the use of an RBF-SVM classifier to distinguish adversaries from natural images in a late-layer feature space. Their approach shows some success against the DeepFool [8] method of attack but has not been analysed for efficacy against the 'feature adversaries' proposed by Sabour & Cao et al. [9] . Gao et al. [3] propose a subtractive scheme, suppressing the neurons whose activations change significantly between the natural and adversarial inputs, arguing that humans would similarly ignore these. The increased robustness is accompanied by a loss of performance accuracy. Zhang et al. [19] propose the data augmentation scheme mixup, wherein convex combinations of input images are mapped to convex combinations of their labels, in an attempt to enable the networks to learn smoother decision boundaries. It is observed that while this scheme offers improved resistance to single-step gradient sign attacks, it is no more robust to iterative attacks of the same type.
Visualisation and analysis of network feature spaces
In an effort to move beyond treating DCNs as black boxes, some works attempt to qualitatively analyse their internal learning dynamics and representations. One approach to this is the identification of images which provoke maximal responses in target networks. In their seminal work, Erhan et al. [20] use gradient ascent to locally optimise the image x * n that maximises the output activation a(n) of a given neuron n. When a(n) represents a class output score, it is observed that, x * n typically comprises high-frequency motifs only abstractly associated with naturally occurring objects of the corresponding class. To make such saliency images more recognisable, subsequent works attempt to regularise the solution space of images. Simonyan et al. [21] propose the use of 2 decay to prevent extreme pixel values in the solutions. Mahendran et al. [22] investigate the use of a Total Variation regulariser to encourage patch-wise visual consistency. Yosinski et al. [23] observe the combined effect of the above regularisation schemes along with two others that clip pixels with small norms and those that contribute minimally to changes in output activations. However, when queried for canonical class images, the networks still respond with patterns that lack recognisable global structure.
Parallel advances include the information theoretic analysis of the learning dynamics of deep networks by Shwartz-Ziv and Tishby [24] . They observe the tendency of these networks, over the course of SGD, to first perform empirical risk minimisation and then enter a prolonged phase of stochastic relaxation. It is in the latter phase that the network representations are compressed while conditioned on the training error, which the authors believe enforces sparsity and prevents overfitting in deep networks. Jo and Bengio [25] argue that deep networks rely on Fourier statistics of images to perform classification, showing that selective filtration of frequency components can cause the networks to underperform significantly on the filtered images while leaving them unchanged in human perception.
Empirical brittleness of networks in the physical world
Though they are generally designed and trained to avoid it, it has been shown (e.g. [26] , [27] ) that deep nets are in practice relatively susceptible to nuisance variables such as scale, deformation, and occlusion. In fact, it has begun to be shown that nets can be attacked not only via synthetic distortions to images, but also via specially crafted real-world objects that retain their effectiveness through image acquisition, as in [28] and [29] . That is to say, some would argue that classifiers are less robust as classifiers, and adversaries more robust as adversaries, than one might hope.
Method
Algorithm 1 Computes mean principal direction vectors and curvatures for a given network's 1-vs.-all decision boundary between target class j and all classes i = j, for a given dataset.
Input: network class score (logit layer) function N , dataset D, target class label j Output: principal curvature basis matrix V and corresponding principal curvature vector c 1: procedure PRINCIPALCURVATURES(N , D, j) 2:
network predicts s to be of class i return (V, c)
The analysis begins as in [5] , with the extraction of the principal directions and curvatures of the classifier's image-space decision boundaries, where the decision boundary between two classes is the zero set of the difference between their corresponding class (logit) scores. Before proceeding, let us clarify the slightly relaxed use of the terms 'principal direction' and 'principal curvature' in [5] and, accordingly, here. Strictly speaking, the principal directions at a point on a manifold in an embedding space (such as an (N −1)-dimensional class decision boundary embedded in N -dimensional image space) are a local concept, forming an orthonormal basis spanning the space tangent to the manifold at that point. The principal curvature associated with each principal direction is the curvature, at the point of tangency, of the normal section of the manifold in the principal direction 4 . Put simply, a principal direction vector and its associated principal curvature tell you how much the surface curves as you move along it in a particular direction, from a given point.
Generally, there is no reason to think that tangent spaces at different points on the boundary surface should coincide, and so a priori, it may not make any sense to speak of "principal directions" in the embedding space. However, the authors of [5] are fully aware of this, and base their analysis on the hypothesis that there exist image-space directions which, when projected onto the respective tangent spaces of different points sampled from the boundary, correspond to similar curvature patterns. In other words, they assume that these directions are largely shared across exemplars. A curvature can then be associated with each such direction by, for instance, taking the mean of the curvatures measured at those sample points. This is the relaxation of the terminology referred to above: the "principal directions" here represent a rotation of the canonical image-space axes, and the "principal curvature" associated with each direction represents the sample mean curvature measured along the tangent component 5 of that vector at each exemplar in a set. Now, any given principal direction basis describes a particular (binary) decision boundary, and it takes many decision boundaries to characterise the classification behaviour of a multiclass net: C 2 boundaries for a C-class classifier. However, in order to understand the boundary properties that are useful for discriminating a given class from all others, it should suffice to analyse only the C 1-vs.-all decision boundaries. Thus, for each class j, the method proceeds by locating samples very near to the decision boundary between j and the union of all classes i = j by perturbing samples from the latter ("source") to the former ("target"). The boundary's geometry is then analysed in the vicinity of these approximate boundary points, and summarised over the sample set. With the above established, we state the initial portion of the method, which closely follows [5] , as Alg. 1.
The authors of [5] hypothesise that the space S i spanned by the i most positively curved directions output by Alg. 1 corresponds to the subspace of the input space from which one can form successful universal adversarial perturbations. In fact, they demonstrate empirically that one can do this simply via random sampling from S i . They also provide a corresponding theoretical argument as to why this should be expected, supplying a bound on the size of the perturbation required to produce a universal adversary along a direction as a function of the curvature of a bounding surface of the actual decision boundary. It is from this point that we begin an iterative loop of further analysis, experimentation, and demonstration that we hope advances the reader's understanding of adversarial attacks on DCNs, and with it, of DCNs themselves. Figure 2 : The left image shows a version of the geometric argument given in [5] connecting positive curvature to universal perturbations: from the perspective of a source point x, if the actual class boundary (solid black) can be locally bounded on the outside by an arc (dashed black) of fixed positive curvature along a particular direction, then a perturbation along that direction large enough to cross the bounding arc must carry x across the actual boundary, changing its class. If such a direction is "shared" over many exemplars, it will accordingly represent a universal perturbation over that set. The right image illustrates that this effect is not particular to positive curvatures: in the negative-curvature case, the same holds true for an imagined point x on the other side of the boundary. The central image shows that a "flat" direction cannot have a material effect on membership of either class.
Experiments and Analysis
A minimalist version of the argument in [5] connecting positively curved directions with the universal adversarial perturbations of [2] is depicted in the leftmost subfigure of Fig. 2 . Essentially, if the normal section of the decision boundary surface along a given direction can be locally bounded on the outside by a circular arc of a particular positive curvature in the vicinity of an exemplar, then geometry accordingly dictates an upper bound on the distance between the exemplar and the boundary in that direction. If such directions and bounds turn out to be largely common across exemplars (which they do), then the existence of universal adversaries follows directly, with higher curvature implying lower-norm adversaries. It is from this point that we move beyond the prior art's analysis.
Provided only that the second-order boundary approximation holds up well over a sufficiently wide perturbation range and variety of exemplars, the model implies that the distance of such adversaries from the decision boundary should increase as a function of their norm. Also, the attack along any positively curved direction should in that case be associated with the corresponding target class: the class j in the call to Alg. 1. And while positively curved directions may be of primary interest in [5] , the extension of the above geometric argument to the negative-curvature case points to an important corollary: as sufficient steps along positive-curvature directions should perturb increasingly into class j, so should steps along negative-curvature directions perturb increasingly away from class j, as in the rightmost subfigure of Fig. 2 . Finally, the plethora of approximately zero-curvature (flat) directions identified in [15, 5] should have negligible effect on class identity, per the middle subfigure of Fig. 2 .
Class identity as a function of the component in specific image-space directions
To test how well the above conjectures hold in practice, we graph statistics of the target and nontarget class scores over the dataset as a function of the magnitude of the perturbation applied in directions identified as above. The results are depicted in Fig. 3 , in which the predicted phenomena are readily evident. Along the selected positive-curvature directions, as the perturbation magnitude increases (with either sign), the population's target class score approaches and then surpasses the highest non-target class score. The monotonicity of this effect is laid bare by graphing the fraction of non-target samples perturbed into the target class, alongside the median target class softmax score. Note, again, that the link between the directions in question and the target class identity is established a priori by Alg. 1. As predicted, the same phenomenon is evident in reverse when using negative-curvature directions instead: all that changes is that it is the population's non-target class scores that overtake its target class score with increasing perturbation magnitude, with natural examples of the target class accordingly being perturbed out of it. Finally, we illustrate the point that flatness of the decision boundary manifests as flatness of both target and non-target class scores: over a wide range of magnitudes, these directions do not influence the network one way or another. Fig. 3 illustrates these effects at the level of the population as a whole: Fig. 1 shows a disaggregation into individual exemplars, with one response curve per sample from a large set. The population-level trends remain evident, but another fact becomes apparent: empirically, the shapes of the curves change very little between most exemplars. They shift vertically to reflect the class score contribution of the orthonormal components, but they themselves do not otherwise much depend on those components. That is to say that at least some key components are approximately additively separable from one another. This fact connects directly to the fact that such directions are "shared" across exemplars in the first place, and thus identifiable by Alg. 1.
A more intuitive picture of what the networks are actually doing begins to emerge: they are identifying the high-curvature image-space directions as features associated with respective class identities. The mean decision boundary curvature along such a direction can then be thought of as representing the empirical average width of the feature response window within which a class will be classified as the "inside class", rather than the "outside class" of the curving boundary. That is, it represents how much of a given pattern an example must or must not possess before it will on average be predicted to be of the associated class: the sensitivity of class identity to the presence of that feature. But if this is true, it suggests that what we have thus identified are actually the directions which the net relies on generally in predicting the classes of natural images, with the curvatures-cum-sensitivities corresponding to their relative weightings. Accordingly, it should be possible to disregard the "flat" directions of near-zero curvature without any noticeable change in the network's class predictions.
Network classification performance versus effective data dimensionality
To confirm the above hypothesis regarding the relative importance of different image-space directions in classification performance, we graph the training and test accuracies of a sample of nets as a function of the subspace onto which their input images are projected. The input subspace is parametrised by a dimensionality parameter d, which controls the number of basis vectors selected per class for orthonormalisation by QR decomposition. We use four variants of selection: the d most positively curved directions per class (yielding the subspace S p ); the d most negatively curved directions per class (yielding the subspace S n ); the union of the previous two (subspace S n∪p ); and the d least curved (flattest) directions per class (subspace S f ). The subspace S so obtained is Each curve represents the median of the class scores over the respective dataset, bracketed below by the 30th-percentile score and above by the 70th. For the positive-curvature directions, the transition into target class graph depicts the fraction of the dataset not originally of the corresponding target class which has been transitioned into the target class by the perturbation, alongside that population's median softmax target-class score. The dashed line represents the fraction of the population originally of the target class that remains in the target class under the perturbation. For the negative-curvature directions, the transition out of target class graph works analogously, but in reverse: sample proportion represents the fraction of the dataset originally of the target class which retains the target-class label under perturbation, with the median softmax target-class score as before. The dashed line now represents the fraction of the dataset not originally of the target class which remains outside of the target class under perturbation. The images in the rightmost column illustrate a sample of these directions as visual patterns. Each block of eight images corresponds to the label (positive, negative, or flat) to its left, and the two-image columns comprising each eight-image block correspond from left to right with the main four net/dataset columns. Each such column illustrates the first two directions for the corresponding net and curvature ordering, for a randomly selected target class.
represented by the orthonormalised basis matrix Q d , and each input image i is then projected 6 onto S as i d = Q d Q d i. Accuracies on {i d } as a function of d are shown in Fig. 4 .
The outcome is striking: not only is the hypothesis satisfied, but it is evident that in many cases, classification decisions have effectively already been made based on a relatively small number Figure 5 : Mean 2 norms of the projections of various adversarial perturbations (DeepFool [8] , FGSM [7] and UAP [2] ) and saliency maps [21] onto different subspaces, as a fraction of their original norms. The definitions of the subspaces S n and S f and the parameter d controlling how many directions are used in their construction are exactly as in Sec. 4.2 and Fig. 4 , against which this figure should be compared.
of features, corresponding to the most curved directions. The sensitivity of the nets along these directions, then, is clearly learned purposefully from the training data, and does largely generalise in testing, as seen. Note also that at this level of analysis, it essentially does not matter whether positively or negatively curved directions are chosen. Another important point emerges here. Since it is the high-curvature directions that are largely responsible for determining the nets' classification decisions, the nets should be vulnerable to adversarial attack along precisely these directions.
Link between classification and adversarial directions
It has already been noted in [15] that adversarial attack vectors evince high components in subspaces spanned by high-curvature directions. We expand the analysis by repeating the procedure of Fig. 4 for various attack methods, to determine whether existing attacks are indeed exploiting the directions in accordance with the classifier's reliance on them. Results are displayed in Fig. 5 , and should be compared against Fig. 4 . The graphs in these figures illustrate the direct relationship between the fraction of adversarial norm in given subspaces and the corresponding usefulness of those subspaces for classification. The inclusion of the saliency images of [21] alongside the attack methods makes explicit the fact that adversaries are themselves an exposure of the net's notion of saliency.
By now, two results hint at a simpler and more direct way of identifying the classification/adversarial directions. First, there is the observation, as displayed in Fig. 5 , that the directions obtained by boundary curvature analysis in Alg. 1 correspond to the directions exploited by various first-order methods. Second, inspection of the class-score curves sampled and displayed in Fig. 1 makes this connection more intuitive: in the vicinity of the origin 7 , the local decision boundary curvature, the curvature of the corresponding class-score function, and the magnitude of the class-score function Figure 6 : Classification accuracies on image sets projected onto subspaces of the spans of collections of respective DeepFool perturbations. For each net-dataset pair, DeepFool perturbations are computed over the image set and assembled into a matrix that is decomposed into its SVD, with singular vectors ordered as per their corresponding singular values: S h represents the high-to-low ordering, S l the low-to-high, and d the number retained in each ordering. This figure should be compared directly to Fig. 4 (while noting the difference in how d now counts directions). For the ImageNet experiments, owing to memory constraints, the SVD is performed on downsampled DeepFools of size 100 × 100 × 3 and 120 × 120 × 3, respectively. The resulting singular vectors span the entire effective classification space of a correspondingly downsampled image space. This is evinced by the fact that the classification accuracy of images projected onto the singular vectors' subspace saturates to the same performance as that yielded when the net is tested directly on the downsampled images.
derivative are, for practical purposes, all duals of one another 8 . Thus, to extract the basis, one need actually only perform SVD on a matrix of stacked class-score gradients 9 . Here, we implement this using a collection of DeepFool perturbations to provide the required gradient information, and repeat the analysis of Fig. 4 , accordingly ordering the singular vectors by their singular values. The results, in Fig. 6 , neatly replicate the previously seen classification accuracy trends for high-to-low and low-to-high curvature traversal of image-space directions. Henceforth, we use these directions directly, simplifying analysis and allowing us to analyse ImageNet networks.
While Fig. 5 displays the magnitudes of components of pre-computed adversarial perturbations in different subspaces, we also design a variation on the analysis to illustrate how effective an efficient attack method (DeepFool) is when confined to the respective subspaces. This is implemented by simply projecting the gradient vectors used in solving DeepFool's linearised problem onto each subspace before otherwise solving the problem as usual. The results, graphed in Fig. 7 , thus represent DeepFool's "earnest" attempts to attack the network as efficiently as possible within each given subspace. This makes clear the fact that the attack must exploit genuine classification directions in order to achieve low norm. Table 1 : The images used to train AlexNet operate at the scale of d o = 227 (pixels on a side). In the pre-processing step, these input images are downsized to d l , before being upsampled back to the original scale. The reconstructed DeepFools lose some of their effectiveness, as seen in the column of fooling rates for f = 1. When the effect of downsampling is supplemented by increasing the value of the 2 norms of these perturbations (using higher values of f ), their efficacy is steadily restored. Note that the mean norms of images and DeepFool perturbations are estimated in the upscaled space, as are the classification accuracies. The accuracy values for d f = {100, 120} should be compared to those at convergence in Fig. 6 . Any difference in the performance scores is strictly due to the random selection of the subset of 2000 test images used for evaluation. Observe that when the human-recognisable object appearance is captured in any given subspace, the corresponding DeepFool perturbation becomes maximally effective as measured in terms of its norm.
On image compression and robustness to adversarial attack
The above observations have made it clear that the most effective directions of adversarial attack are also the directions that contribute the most to the DCNs' classification performance. Hence, any attempt to mitigate adversarial vulnerability by discarding these directions, either by compressing the input data [31, 32, 33] or by suppressing specific components of image representations at intermediate network layers [4, 3] , must effect a loss in the classification accuracy. Further, our framework anticipates the fact that the nets must remain just as vulnerable to attack along the remaining directions that continue to determine classification decisions, given that the corresponding class-score functions, which possess the properties discussed earlier, remain unchanged. We use image downsampling as an example data compression technique to illustrate this effect on ImageNet.
We proceed by inserting a pre-processing unit between the DCN and its input at test time. This unit downsamples the input image to a lower size d l before upsampling it back to the original input size d o . The resizing (by bicubic interpolation) serves to reduce the effective dimensionality of the input data. For a randomly selected set of 2000 ImageNet [34] test images, we observe the change in classification accuracy over different values of d l , shown in column 4 of Table 1 . The fooling rates 10 for the downsampled versions of these natural images' adversarial counterparts, produced by applying DeepFool to the original network (neglecting the resampling unit), follow in column 5 of the table. At first glance, it appears that the downsampling-based pre-processing unit has afforded an increase in the network robustness at a moderate cost in accuracy. Results pertaining to this tradeoff have been widely reported [31, 32, 3] . Here, we take the analysis a step further.
To start, we note the fact that the methodology just described represents a transfer attack from the original net to the net as modified by the inclusion of the resampling unit. As DeepFool perturbations are not designed to transfer in this manner, we first augment them by simply increasing their 2 norm by a scalar factor f . We adjust f from unity up to a point at which the mean DeepFool perturbation norm is still a couple of orders of magnitude smaller than the mean image norm, such that the perturbations remain largely imperceptible. The corresponding fooling rates grow steadily with respect to f , as is observable in Table 1 . Hence, although the original full-resolution perturbations may be suboptimal attacks on the resampling variants of the network (as some components are effectively lost to projection onto the compressed space), sufficient rescaling restores their effectiveness. On the other hand, the modified net continues to be equally vulnerable along the remaining effective classification directions, and can easily be attacked directly. To go about this, we simply take the SVD of the stack of downsampled DeepFool perturbations, for d l values of 100 and 120 (owing to memory constraints). The resulting singular vectors yield the graphs in the rightmost subfigure of Fig 6. As can be garnered from the figure, these singular vectors span the entire space of residual classification/adversarial directions of the corresponding resampling network. More crucially, lowernorm DeepFools can be obtained by restricting the attack's iterative linear optimisation procedure to the space spanned by these compressed perturbations, exactly as described in Sec. 4.3 and displayed in Fig. 7 . This subspace-confined optimisation is analogous to designing a white-box DeepFool attack for the new network architecture inclusive of the resampling unit, instead of the original network, and is as effective as before. Note that this observation is consistent with the results reported in [33] , where the strength of the examined gradient-based attack methods increases progressively as the targeted model better approximates the defending model.
Discussion and Conclusion
Let us distil the observations we have made. For all of the DCNs examined:
1. We have exposed a collection of directions along which the network's class-score output functions exhibit a striking similarity across exemplars. These directions can be isolated using either second-or first-order methods.
2. While the class-score functions along these directions are nonlinear, they are de facto of a constrained form: axis-symmetric 11 and low-order, often monotonic within each half space.
3. There is a close relationship between these directions and class identity: many such directions, over large ranges, represent the extent to which a particular target class is or is not believed by the net to be present. 4 . Crucially, the net derives its predictive ability from its responses to input components in these directions, with the most important directions for prediction being those along which the net is most sensitive, irrespective of whether those components have occurred naturally or due to adversarial attack. Thus, as it stands, predictive power and adversarial vulnerability are intertwined.
5.
Suppressing the net's response to some directions it considers salient simply exchanges accuracy for robustness. Further, when such a minor modification is made to a network in the interest of increasing robustness, the network actually remains vulnerable to a properly designed attack along whichever directions it continues to use.
In retrospect, the discovery of the universal adversarial perturbations of [2] strongly hinted at this result. Those attacks are "universal" in precisely the sense that certain fixed directions perturb exemplars across class boundaries irrespective of the diversity in their individual appearances, i.e., irrespective of the input components in all orthogonal directions. Note also that our results explain the "dominant label" phenomenon of [2] , noted as curious but otherwise left unaddressed, in which a given universal perturbation overwhelmingly moves examples into a small number of target classes regardless as to original class identities. This is a manifestation of the targeting of particular classes by particular directions, a phenomenon so strong that it manifests in [2] despite the fact that their algorithm never explicitly optimises for this property.
The quasi-symmetry of the feature responses may not be surprising to those with a background in hand-engineering features for computer vision. It simply reflects the fact that descriptors of natural 11 Though not necessarily so for MNIST in particular, as is explained below.
images must typically neglect sign, because contrast inversion is a fact of the world 12 One can revisit, for instance, [35] for a reminder. Empirically, this appears to be the nonlinearity that is by far the most important. Note that DCNs trained on MNIST are exceptional in that they may not always adhere to this, as MNIST is unnatural in its fixing of contrast sign.
Additionally, one must take care with the terms 'overfitting' and 'generalisation' when discussing the issue of adversariality. Inspection of Figs. 4 and 6 will convince the reader that the directions of vulnerability produce fits that generalise very well to unseen data generated by the same distribution, seen as the near identity between training and test accuracy curves over the directions of highest curvature (or derivative) magnitude. In fact, overfitting (the divergence between the train and test error curves), happens over less salient (and thus, less vulnerable) directions.
We conclude by noting that for schemes hoping to address the problem of adversarial vulnerability to be truly effective, whatever their approach, they must lead to a fundamentally more insightful (and likely complicated) use of features than presently occurs. We hope that it is appreciated that as long as DCNs continue to use features as they currently do, there is no need for a separate concept of 'adversaries'.
